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Brexit and Financial Services: What Comes Next? 
Michael Randall* 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Like many areas concerning Brexit, accurately predicting the outcome of negotiations 
concerning the provision of financial services and future developments is problematic. The 
%UH[LW:KLWH3DSHUVWDWHV³In our new strategic partnership agreement we will be aiming for 
WKHIUHHVWSRVVLEOHWUDGHLQILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVEHWZHHQWKH8.DQG(8PHPEHUVWDWHV´1 
At present, financial service providers based within the single market benefit from 
µSDVVSRUWLQJ¶SULYLOHJHVPassporting, formalised by the second banking directive of 19892, 
allows institutions established in one member state to freely provide and access services 
in other member states, with further passports issued to EEA states. Compliance with a 
common minimum regulatory standard as a condition of continued single market 
membership facilitates trading through passporting. 
The UK and the remaining EU-27 states benefit from passporting due to the 
different concentration of expertise in financial matters across the Union. It is far easier to 
access financial expertise across borders through enabling the provision of a service 
rather than by relocating individuals. ³)UHHVW SRVVLEOH´ WUDGH ZRXOG HQWDLO UHPDLQLQJ D
member of the single market. Yet there have been repeated statements that the UK will 
leave the single market. Accordingly, the relationship will at least be different. 
B. INTERESTS OF THE UK, SCOTLAND AND EU-27 IN NEGOTIATIONS 
Passporting rights create a strong incentive for institutions to maintain a presence in an EU 
member state. As &LW\8.VWDWHV³There are more head offices of banks in London than in any 
other place in the world«There are also over 250 foreign banks with an office in London. This 
is higher than nearest rivals New York, Paris and Frankfurt´3 Therefore, one of the aims in 
negotiations is to prevent overseas financial service providers from withdrawing institutional 
representation from the EU post-Brexit. 
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1 +0*RYHUQPHQW5HSRUW7KH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V([LW)URPDQG1HZ3DUWQHUVKLS:LWKWKH(XURSHDQ
Union (February 2017) at para 8.25 
2 Council Directive 89/646/EC OJ 1989 L386 
3 TheCityUK, London available at https://www.thecityuk.com/about-us/uk-work-programme/new-u-k-
interactive-map-page/london/ 
Passporting rights are only one part of the equation however. If all single market states 
were equal, in theory it would make no difference in which state banks are established. There 
must be another reason why London specifically hosts a higher concentration of overseas 
financial institutions. This relates to the particular expertise located in London. CityUK state 
³/RQGRQLis the second largest global fund management centre. It manages more than 80% of 
hedge fund assets under management in Europe, 90% of European prime brokerage, and is 
the leading centre for management of European private equity funds´4  These statistics 
indicate that the UK has a highly tradeable service of value to the EU-27. Michel Barnier is 
UHSRUWHG WR KDYH DIILUPHG WR 0(3V LQ -DQXDU\  KLV SUHIHUHQFH IRU D ³VSHFLDO´
relationship to maintain access to the City post-Brexit.5 His comments reflect the risk that, 
unless a deal is reached, financial instability will spread to the detriment of national 
economies. This indicates that the sector is a trump card for the UK in negotiations. 
From a UK perspective, losing passporting rights means it may no longer be as 
attractive a place for establishment, which may lead to institutional relocation and a detrimental 
impact on the UK economy. A 2016 PWC report6 indicates that the financial sector contributes 
£32.4 billion in taxation p.a. to the Treasury, of which £17.8 billion is from income taxes and 
£16.8 bLOOLRQ LVIURPµIRUHLJQ¶EDQNV,QWKHJURVVYDOXHDGGHG*9$E\ WKH&LW\ZDV
approximately £81 billion, with 751,000 people employed in total.7  
Conversely, there may be other financial hubs that could benefit in the long term if 
institutions relocate. Two studies have shown at least half of any financial sector jobs leaving 
London could relocate to Frankfurt, with a minimum of 8,000 new positions created8 and that 
Brexit could create up to 88,000 new jobs in the Rhine-Main region.9 However, this would be 
extremely costly and there is no automatic guarantee that the same level of service would be 
maintained. Relocation would also take a significant amount of time, thus it remains in the 
interests of the entire EU-27 for financial service provision in the UK to continue. 
C. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO: SCOTLAND AND NORTHERN IRELAND 
                                               
4 Ibid 
5 - 5DQNLQ ³(8 1HJRWLDWRU :DQWV µ6SHFLDO¶ 'HDO 2YHU $FFHVV WR &LW\ 3RVW-%UH[LW´ DYDLODEOH DW
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jan/13/eu-negotiator-wants-special-deal-over-access-to-
city-post-brexit  
6 PWC: 2016 Total Tax Contribution of the UK Banking Sector (November 2016) 
7 TheCityUK, London available at https://www.thecityuk.com/about-us/uk-work-programme/new-u-k-
interactive-map-page/london/&LW\8.¶VILJXUHVDUHXVHGLQWKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶V%UH[LW:KLWH3DSHU 
8 Helaba Research Unit: Finanzplatz Frankfurt in Der Pole-Position Für Brexit-Banker (in German at 
https://www.helaba.de/blob/helaba/436294/e25e37900d3958a4627cae86ffd8fb59/finanzplatz-studie-
20170831-data.pdf)  
9 :+8 2WWR %HLVKHLP 6FKRRO RI 0DQDJHPHQW :LQQLQJ )UDQNIXUW %UH[LW %DQNHUV¶ :HOIDUH (IIHFW
Beyond Bringing Their Jobs 
Contrary to the WestminsteU JRYHUQPHQW¶V DSSURDFK WKH 6FRWWLVK *RYHUQPHQW KDV
FRQVLVWHQWO\ DGYRFDWHG IRU UHWHQWLRQ RI DFFHVV WR WKH VLQJOH PDUNHW QRWDEO\ LQ µ6FRWODQG¶V
Place in Europe¶ 7KLV GRFXPHQW DFNQRZOHGJHV that ³[s]ectors like financial services have 
significant spillovers into other parts of the economy and, therefore, any slowdown here will 
LPSDFW PRUH ZLGHO\ RQ SHRSOH DQG EXVLQHVVHV´10 It also discusses passporting11 and 
concludes that financial services should be one of the policy areas considered for further 
devolution.12 Scotland has the largest financial sector outside of the City, employing over 
SHRSOHDQGFRQWULEXWLQJRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VHFRQRP\13 Professor Adam Tomkins, 
regarding the feasibility of a Brexit deal that works for the whole of the UK, stated, ³WKHLQWHUHVWV
of the financial services industry in Edinburgh, which is a significant part of the Edinburgh 
economy, are the same as those of the City of London´14  
However, divergence between the Westminster and Scottish governments concerning 
financial services could create differing interests in any second independence referendum. If 
an independent Scotland were to join the EU, it could develop its financial services sector in 
order to obtain passporting rights and freely provide expertise to other states. This would not 
be a simple process, but during any transition period, Scotland could develop innovative and 
unique tradeable services. The question mark in this situation is whether other EU states could 
develop similar expertise during the interim period. 
It is also prudent to discuss how the question of the hard Irish border could inform the 
provision of UK financial services, although this is outlined as a speculative improbability as 
opposed to a realistic outcome. The European Parliament seems set to propose that Northern 
Ireland remains in the single market.15 Northern Ireland could retain passporting rights, 
including any subsidiaries of companies in London. If managed correctly, this solution could 
mitigate relocation outside of the UK to the benefit of Northern Ireland.  
Compliance with new EU banking regulations would be problematic since they could be 
implemented in Northern Ireland without WHVWPLQVWHU¶V input. Furthermore, Schedule 3 of the 
Northern Ireland Act (1998) provides ILQDQFLDO VHUYLFHV DUH D µ5HVHUYHG¶ PDWWHU IRU
Westminster unless the Secretary of State gives permission otherwise.16 The current 
                                               
10 6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW6FRWODQG¶V3ODFHLQ(XURSH'HFember 2016) at para 37 
11 Ibid at Paras 39(e) and 49 
12 Ibid at Para 186(h) 
13 TheCityUK, Scotland available at https://www.thecityuk.com/about-us/uk-work-programme/new-u-k-
interactive-map-page/scotland/ 
14 House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, Brexit: Devolution Inquiry, 1 February 
2017 at Q3 
15 See J Stone, Brexit: European Parliament to Propose Northern Ireland Stays in Single Market 
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-northern-ireland-border-guy-
verhofstadt-single-market-customs-union-european-parliament-a7972596.html 
16 House of Lords European Union Committee, Brexit: Devolution (19 July 2017) at para 24 
Secretary of State, James Brokenshire, has indicated Northern Ireland will leave the single 
market.17 There are clearly many hurdles for this to be a long-term practical solution. 
D. ALTERNATIVES TO PASSPORTING 
The relationship between the UK and the EU-27 with regard to the provision of financial 
services is likely to take one of two forms, either . The first is through a Mutual Recognition 
Agreement (MRA) or a Third Country Regime (TCR), a form of free trade agreement. The 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO 5HJXODWRU\ 6WDWXWRU\ *URXS¶V ,65*18) report on alternatives to passporting 
found that ³WKH PRVW IDYRXUDEOH VROXWLRQ LV OLNHO\ WR EH IRU WKH 8. DQG (8 WR HQWHU LQWR D
EHVSRNHDJUHHPHQW WRDOORZPXWXDODFFHVV WRHDFKRWKHU¶VPDUNHWV. This could be on the 
basis of mutual recognition, or on the basis that the two regimes are broadly consistent (rather 
WKDQVWULFWO\µHTXLYDOHQW¶XQGHUWKHDSSURDFKFXUUHQWO\XVHGLQWKH7&5V´19  The principle of 
mutual recognition at present applies to goods and is a process in cross border trade whereby 
goods which are able to be sold lawfully in one member state can be sold lawfully in another 
6WDWH LQVSLWHRI WKHSURGXFW¶V lack of FRQIRUPLW\ZLWK WKH ODWWHU6WDWH¶V WHFKQLFDO UXOHV7KH
ISRG report acknowledges that: 
³7KH(8KDVHQWHUHGLQWRDQXPEHURI05$VZLWKWKLUGFRXQWULHV (including Australia, Canada, 
Japan, New Zealand, the USA, Israel and Switzerland), although so far these MRAs only relate 
to trade in goods and it is not clear that they would be extended to the provision of services´20  
An MRA in financial services would be unprecedented, but so is the withdrawal of a 
member state from the single market. The ISRG strongly advocate this approach due to the 
difficulties of the second option, of a TCR.creation of a free trade agreement, also referred to 
as Third Country Regimes (TCR) or equivalences. For a TCR to be agreed by the European 
Commission three conditions must be met: 
³L7KHUHTXLUHPHQWVXQGHUDVVHVVPHQWDUHOHJDOO\ELQGLQJ 
ii) They are subject to effective supervision by local authorities;  
LLL7KH\DFKLHYHWKHVDPHUHVXOWVDV(8UXOHV´21 
                                               
17 See R Merrick, 0LQLVWHU,QVLVWV8.:LOO/HDYH(8µ$V2QH1DWLRQ¶6SXUQLQJ6XJJHVWLRQV1RUWKHUQ
Ireland Could Remain in the Single Market available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-northern-ireland-border-single-market-customs-
union-james-brokenshire-european-parliament-a7976996.html 
18 Comprising practitioners in the financial and professional services industry 
19 ,65*7KH(8¶V7KLUG&RXQWU\5HJLPHVDQG$OWHUQDWLYHVWR3DVVSRUWLQJ-DQXDU\ 
20 Ibid at p.138 
21 European Parliament Briefing: Third-Country Equivalence in EU Banking Legislation 
,65*¶VFRQFHUQVDUHWKDWDOWKRXJKWKHUHDUHH[DPSOHVRIHTXLYDOHQFHVLQRSHUDWLRQ
they are of a limited scope and provide insufficient data from which to draw firm conclusions. 
Chapter 13 of the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) concerns financial services. It seeks to liberalise trade based on the WTO¶V*HQHUDO
Agreement on Trade in Services by focusing on cross-border supply, consumption abroad, 
commercial presence and presence of natural persons. In addition to a lack of conclusive data, 
it appears that any TCR would require the UK need to comply with WTO principles. This would 
preclude the UK from favouring its own financial institutions under the most-favoured nation 
UXOHV3HLKDQLFRQFOXGHV³&(7$LVDOVRDSRRUSROLF\FKRLFHJLYHQWKHVLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFH
RIWKH8.¶VDQG&DQDGD¶VWUDGHSURILOHV´22 and should not be the model the UK adopts. 
Both oSWLRQVUHTXLUHWKH8.¶VUHJXODWRU\VWDQGDUGVWREHVXIILFLHQWO\FRPSDUDEOHWRWKH
EU-27 in order to gain access to the market. As Moloney notes, these arrangements mean 
that it is unlikely that there will be a great divergence in core governance between the EU-27 
and the UK.23 This is further supported by the fact that the UK and the EU are both members 
of the G20 and are parties to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, meaning both 
would be required to adopt resulting financial service standards agreed in these forums. Until 
the provisional date of withdrawal of March 2019 (excluding any transition period) the UK is 
still required to implement Directives and Regulations. This includes in financial matters and 
therefore includes major pieces of policy, such as the MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive) II24 provisions, which seek to improve protection for investors by reinforcing 
transparency and has a provisional entry into force date of January 2018.25 
E. OPPORTUNITIES AND INNOVATION 
Thus far, this article has highlighted the potential dangers of Brexit for financial services across 
the UK. However, µQHFHVVLW\ LV WKH PRWKHU RI LQYHQWLRQ¶ and the sector is susceptible to 
technological innovation. Although ultimately it is likely that only the peripheral areas of 
financial regulation that will change, the UK may be able to develop a more bespoke regulatory 
system and exclude some EU provisions, which may be perceived as being inefficient, to 
create a competitive advantage.26 For example, this could include development of and 
investment in Financial Technology (FinTech), such as peer-to-peer lending (P2P) and 




42(1) E.L.Rev 122 
24 Council Directive 2014/65 OJ 2014 L173/349 
25 SHH36QRZGRQHWDO³0L)L',,0L)L5´2FW&RPSOLDQFH2IILFHU%XOOHWLQ 
26 6HH%5H\QROGVDQG7'RQHJDQ³%UH[LW± 2SSRUWXQLW\IRUD5HERRWRI)LQDQFLDO6HUYLFHV´
31(12) J.I.B.L.R 613 
challenger banks.27 Akintewe states that ³[w]LWK6FRWODQG¶VHVWDEOLVKHGILQDQFLDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUH
Fintech presents huge opportunity for the Scottish economy´28 However he also states that 
there are concerns regarding, for example, consumer protection and money laundering. 
Moloney states that Fintech will cause a greater shift in EU financial governance than Brexit29, 
indicating not all potential changes in the financial services sector are attributable to Brexit.  
Reinvention could also include emerging markets in Islamic finance. The Islamic 
Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector currently ranks the UK as 22nd out of 
124 countries for Islamic finance offerings30, making it the leading European State in this area. 
This sector could be developed further to create a niche to mitigate any potential negative 
effects through relocation of services to facilitate trade with Islamic finance centres beyond 
the EU. These services could later be provided to the EU-27 for, particularly in an independent 
Scotland in the single market.31 
F. CONCLUSION 
On the evidence presented, it is clear that the provision of financial services is a priority in 
negotiations for the UK, including the Scottish government, and the EU-27. Due to the decision 
to leave the single market and the likely loss of passporting rights, the outlook initially appears 
to be bleak. Yet when further consideration is given to the alternative arrangements of mutual 
recognition and free trade agreements, it is likely that core regulation will remain similar 
between the EU and the UK. If there are to be changes, it is likely to be at the edges of financial 
regulation. This may act as a catalyst for UK financial services to reinvent themselves and be 
a pioneer in finance in the longer term. However, in the short to medium term the primary 
concern has to be on the guarantees given to financial institutions to disincentivise relocation 
of services. This clarity is needed in the interests of financial stability from both the UK and 
EU-27 sides, which at the time of writing is not forthcoming. 
                                               
27 6HH//X³)LQDQFLDO7HFKQRORJ\DQG&KDOOHQJHU%DQNVLQWKH8.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(2017) 32(7) J.I.B.L.R 273 
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House Lawyer 70 
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30 ICD, Islamic Finance Development Report (2016) at p.12 
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